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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impacts of private placement 
announcements by Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) on existing 
shareholders. The study examines 96 A-REIT private placements from January 2000 to 
December 2012. 
Design/methodology/approach – Utilising event study methodology the authors examine the 
impact on existing shareholders wealth by measuring the abnormal returns (AR) around the 
placement announcement. The authors extend the analysis to model the A-REITs ARs against 
a number of explanatory variables to investigate the possible drivers for the observed event 
study results. 
Findings– The results support the information signalling hypothesis, in that existing investors 
in A-REITs earn negative and significant cumulative ARs of −1.3 per cent over the three-day 
event window [−1, +1]. This result is in contrast to prior studies conducted on industrial firms, 
for example; Hertzel and Smith (1993), Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) and Wruck and Wu (2009). 
 Practical implications– Regression analysis shows A-REITs trading at a premium to net 
tangible assets and A-REITs that use placement funds for their core business have a positive 
impact on announcement ARs. 
Originality/value– This paper adds to the existing literature surrounding private placements 
and is the first paper, to the authors’ knowledge, to examine the impact of Australian REITs. 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the wealth effects to existing shareholders during the 
issuing of private equity in the Australian Real Estate Investment Trust (A-REIT) sector. We 
employ event study methodology on A-REIT private placements from January 2000 to 
December 2012, to evaluate the potential direct costs and benefits to existing shareholders by 
measuring abnormal and cumulative average abnormal returns (AR) around the announcement 
of private placements. This study extends on the research into A-REIT private placements by 
Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) by examining a longer study period with an increased number of 
observations. The current study also calculates the risk-adjusted returns to existing 
shareholders around the announcement and importantly, it examines the possible drivers for 
the observed excess returns by modelling the cumulative average ARs against a number of 
explanatory variables. 
 To date, only one study has explicitly examined the wealth effects for REIT 
shareholders following a private placement. Marciukaityte et al. (2007) examined US REIT 
private placement announcements from 1981 to 1999. It is the aim of this study to add to the 
limited research in this area with a more up-to-date study period. This study also includes a 
period of major structural change in the A-REIT sector due to the impacts of the global financial 
crisis. In addition, Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs) need to pay out 100 per 
cent of their earnings in the form of dividends to avoid punitive taxes, compared to 95 per cent 
for US REITs. This pay out ratio may increase the reliance of A-REITs on the capital markets 
to raise funds. 
 Private placements are generally made to larger institutional investors such as insurance 
companies, pension funds and investment banks (Parrino et al., 2012). Placements provide a 
number of advantages over public issues, namely, they are a relatively quick way of raising 
funds, the issuing firm does not need to provide a disclosure document or prospectus. The offer 
price is likely to be higher than a public offer due to the investors being institutional investors 
that are expected to be better informed and thus need less incentive to purchase the shares on 
offer than the general public. Finally, the shares can be selectively placed with investors that 
the board see as supportive of the current management structure (Parrino et al., 2012). 
However, existing shareholders often do not like private equity raisings due to reduced 
proportional ownership and therefore voting power (Dimovski and O’Neill, 2012). To protect 
existing shareholders the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listing rules 7.1 and 7.2 place 
a restriction on the number of shares that can be placed privately without shareholder approval, 
currently 15 per cent in any one year. 
 Prior research in this area has shown that private placements by conventional firms have 
resulted in positive and significant ARs (Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; Wruck, 1989; Wruck and 
Wu, 2009). Hertzel and Smith (1993) argue that the positive ARs are due to the undervaluation 
hypothesis. The undervaluation hypothesis is derived from the information signalling theory, 
which suggest that new equity issues by a firm conveys new information to the market that 
managers believe the firm is overvalued (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Myers and Majluf (1984) 
suggest that managers of undervalued firms that have a positive NPV project, but lack financial 
slack, will elect not to issue new equity if the portion of existing assets transferred to the new 
shareholders is greater than the increase in firm value retained by existing shareholders, 
resulting in managers forgoing a positive NPV project. However, the authors note that this 
problem can be overcome if managers can costlessly convey their private information to the 
market. Hertzel and Smith (1993) hypothesise that private placement of equity can solve the 
undervaluation problem for managers and therefore avoid forgoing an investment opportunity. 
It then follows that managers who use private placements to finance projects are signalling to 
the market the firm is undervalued resulting in positive ARs (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). 
 This study is the first to measure the ARs related to a private placement announcement 
in the A-REIT sector. Prior research by Marciukaityte et al. (2007) found, contrary to general 
industry studies, that existing shareholders of US REITs earn negative and significant CARs 
of −0.82 per cent around the announcement date. The authors suggest that this result is due to 
“REIT managers being able to time the placements with hot equity markets and good real estate 
investment markets” (Marciukaityte et al., 2007, p. 398), contradicting the undervaluation 
hypothesis of Hertzel and Smith (1993) and supporting the information signalling hypothesis. 
 An innovative feature of this study is that it will investigate the impact that the global 
financial crisis may have had on the placement of private equity by A-REITs and the impact 
for existing shareholders. Figure 1 shows that since the mid-1990s the A-REIT sector has 
grown from a market capitalisation of approximately $10 billion to a peak of $147 billion in 
October 2007 prior to the global financial crisis. The global financial crisis had a significant 
impact on the A-REIT sector with the market capitalisation falling 68.7 per cent to $46 billion 
in February 2009. Since then the A-REIT sector has rallied to approximately $92 billion market 
capitalisation as at December 2013. 
  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 discusses the institutional 
features of the A-REIT sector. Section 3 provides a discussion of previous literature. Section 4 
presents the method employed in this study, Section 5 discusses the data collection for our 
sample and Section 6 presents the results of the event study and regression analysis. Finally, 
we provide some concluding discussions in Section 7. 
A-REIT institutional background 
A-REITs provide investors access to assets that may otherwise be out of reach for individual 
investors, in addition, A-REITs provide diversification benefits to direct property portfolios 
along with investments across other asset classes (ASX, 2013). The A-REIT sector accounts 
for approximately 6 per cent of the market capitalisation of the ASX (Dimovski et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, REITs serve a vital capital function for the real estate market (Allen et al., 2000). 
Previous A-REIT research has demonstrated that, prior the onset of the GFC, A-REITs 
experienced exceptional performance, portfolio diversification benefits, low risk and investor 
acceptance by both general and institutional investors (Lee et al., 2007; Newell, 2005; Newell 
and Peng, 2008; Newell and Tan, 2003; Ratcliffe and Dimovski, 2007). Newell and Peng 
(2009) show the average annual return of A-REITs was over 20 per cent over a three-year 
period prior to the GFC and were the best performing asset class in eight of the 12 years from 
1996 to 2007. 
 Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) argue that there has been a change in the risk profile of 
A-REITs during their study period of 2000 to 2005. The authors suggest that this change is due 
to higher exposure to international properties, greater debt levels and an increased reliance on 
non-passive income. Doble (2009) discusses that the ability to service their debt commitments 
and movement away from their core business as major reasons why the A-REIT sector suffered 
such large losses during the GFC. During and post the GFC, a majority of A-REITs reduced 
their debt levels via recapitalisation and balance sheet restructuring using equity raisings 
(Newell and Peng, 2009). The increased equity raising has seen the average debt levels fall to 
approximately 26 per cent since the GFC, compared to over 40 per cent at the end of 2007 
(Potts, 2012). Following the restructuring, A-REITs have moved back to their core business 
and this re-focusing has resulted in improved performance (Ratcliffe and Dimovski, 2013)[1]. 
Table I provides a list of the top 17 A-REITs via market capitalisation as at June 2013. 
 The A-REIT sector is a significant component of the global REIT market. Australia is 
ranked second behind the USA in terms of market capitalisation, making up over 9 per cent of 
the global REIT market and 49 per cent of the Asia Pacific REIT sector (EPRA, 2012). The A-
REIT sector is recognised as a world leader in securitised property, operating in an established 
regulatory environment providing investors with governance and liquidity (Higgins and Ng, 
2009). Furthermore, Newell (2008) highlights the sector's importance to superannuation funds, 
with the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) estimating that the collective 
worth of Australia's superannuation funds is over $1.5 trillion as at March 2013. 
Superannuation funds have over 10 per cent of their assets allocated to real estate, this includes 
approximately 2 per cent directly invested in A-REITs (APRA, 2012, 2013). The importance 
of the A-REIT sector is expected to continue to grow as the retirement investment industry 
responds to the demands of an ageing population. Reddy (2013) examined the asset allocation 
of industry superannuation funds and found funds would improve their risk-adjusted returns by 
increasing their investment allocation in property assets to 21 per cent. In addition, a market 
report by Jones Lang LaSalle (2012) has forecasted real estate allocation by superannuation 
fund to increase to 25 per cent over the next decade. Dimovski (2008, 2009) further identify 
the importance of A-REIT IPOs and capital raisings along with dividend forecasts for both 
retail and institutional investors, while Newell and Peng (2008) highlight the importance of 
emerging property sectors both in Australia and the USA. 
 The institutional features of the A-REIT market provide a unique setting to test the 
undervaluation hypothesis. More specifically, A-REITs are required to distribute 100 per cent 
of net taxable income to shareholders to avoid paying income tax at the trust level (tax 
transparency). Thus limiting the ability to utilise retained earnings to finance new investments. 
Furthermore, this high level of distribution and the reliance on the capital markets for funding 
investments (Marciukaityte et al., 2007) may reduce information asymmetries between A-
REITs and shareholders resulting in the market being able to price A-REITs more effectively 
(Ratcliffe et al., 2009). Prior empirical investigations show a high reliance on the capital 
markets, for example, Ghosh et al. (1997) show that from 1992 to 1997, US REITs issued 
equity three times more frequently than debt and raised twice as much capital using equity as 
compared to debt. Masulis and Korwar (1986) argue that regulated structures have less adverse 
reaction to equity announcements than industrial firms. The structure forces the firms to issue 
equity frequently and as such, the market anticipates these offerings. Therefore, the authors 
suggest that equity issues by regulated firms have less information content. 
 
Previous literature 
Prior research on equity offerings by REITs has focused on seasoned equity offerings (SEO) 
and results have shown, on average, support for the information signalling theory. For example, 
Ghosh et al. (1999) find significant negative ARs around the event window [0, +1] in their 
study of US REITs. Ghosh et al. (2013) finds negative and significant ARs in the days leading 
up to the announcement and the five days post and conclude that issuing REITs underperform 
when compared to non-issuing REITs. Ong et al. (2011) also find significant negative ARs of 
−1.2 per cent over the [0, +1] event period for both Japan and Singapore REITs. The authors 
also find evidence that REIT managers time SEOs with favourable market conditions. 
 Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) reported on some of the characteristics of A-REIT 
placements from 2006 to 2011. The study showed that the average price discount around 
announcement on private placements was 7.1 per cent[2] and an average standard deviation of 
returns for 250 days prior of 3.5 per cent for the full study period. The study partitioned the 
data set into pre- and post-GFC. Results showed an increase in the average of funds raised, 
$112 million in the pre-GFC set compared to $269 million in the post-GFC. Furthermore the 
average price discount jumped from 2.6 per cent pre-GFC to 12.1 per cent post and the standard 
deviation of returns was 1.4 and 4.8 per cent for pre and post-GFC, respectively. 
 Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) also examined the returns to subscribers and existing 
shareholders on both the listing day and ten days post announcement. For the full sample 
subscribers received, on average, a 7.7 per cent return on the announcement day and 7.8 per 
cent on day ten. Existing shareholder returns were −0.8 and 0.1 per cent, respectively. 
Comparison of pre and post-GFC showed subscribers earned, on average, a 1.6 per cent return 
pre-GFC and 14.5 per cent returns post-GFC over the ten-day period. Existing shareholders 
received returns of 0.1 per cent pre and 0.3 per cent post-GFC over the same time period. 
 These results highlight the impact that the GFC has had on the overall market and in 
particular the A-REIT sector. Namely, volatility nearly 3.5 times more, a substantial increase 
in funds raised privately and an increase in the discount offered of nearly 2.5 times than that of 
the earlier period. Furthermore, the study supports the findings of Zarebski and Dimovski 
(2012) who highlighted the limited funding opportunities due to very low liquidity in debt 
markets and falling asset values had a dramatic impact on the A-REIT sector. 
 Examination of the announcement period excess returns of US REITs following private 
placements by Marciukaityte et al. (2007) found existing shareholders receive significant and 
negative CARs of −0.82 per cent over the [−1,+1] event window during the study period of 
1981 to 1999. This result is in contrast to the findings of Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) and Wruck and Wu (2009) who all found positive and significant CARs around 
announcement in their examination of private placements by conventional firms. Furthermore, 
Marciukaityte et al. (2007) found long-term positive and significant buy-and-hold ARs over 
the two- to five-year period. Again this result is in contrast to prior studies of conventional 
firms (Hertzel et al., 2002; Krishnamurthy et al., 2005; Wruck and Wu, 2009). The authors 
concluded that REIT managers time their placements for when equity prices are high, but long-
term ARs are associated with prior performance and REIT managers are able to utilise the 




This study employs an event study methodology based on that set out by Brown and Warner 
(1985) to measure abnormal shareholder returns to existing shareholders around the 
announcement period. To implement the event study methodology the market model method 
is employed which accounts for the risk associated with the market and mean returns. The 
market model was estimated for each company over a 100-day estimation period (t−120, t−20). 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to determine the parameter estimations. The 
following market model is employed: 
 
where E(Ri,t) is the estimated return on security i on day t, αi represents the intercept term, βi 
the slope coefficient. Rm,t the measure of the observed return for the market index, in this case 
the S&P/ASX200[3], on day t; and ɛi,t the standard error term. Heggen and Gannon (2008) 
note that there is a potential bias in estimating the parameters of the market model when using 
daily returns for shares that trade infrequently, to avoid this bias we utilise the Scholes and 
Williams (1977) adjusted β method[4]. The AR of the shares for firm i in the event window is 
calculated as: 
 
We estimate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for any interval [t1:t2] during 
the event window as: 
 
Consistent with prior REIT research on private placements and SEO announcements (Higgins 
et al., 2004; Ong et al., 2011) the event window is 21 days (T=[−10,+10]), where t=[0] denotes 
the day the placement is announced. Selection of a 21-day event window allows us to identify 
any possible information leakage before the announcement and also how the market may 
reassess any new information post the announcement. To investigate the robustness of our 
results and to provide comparison with previous literature, analysis of a number of additional 
event periods within the event window was conducted. To determine the statistical significance 
of the calculated AR and CAR, a standard cross-sectional test statistic was estimated[5]. 
Regression analysis 
A regression model was developed to examine the ARs calculated above for A-REITs involved 
in a private placement, with independent variables being selected on the basis of prior literature. 
OLS regression was utilised to test the significance of the relationship between each A-REIT 
CARs over the three-day event window [−1,+1], the regression model is: 
 
The independent variables are defined as follows: 
DISC is the percentage discount of the subscription price in relation to the share price the day 
prior the announcement, calculated as the share price day −1, less the subscription price divided 
by day −1 share price. A positive value here means the investor in the placement has received 
the shares at a discount. Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that the more difficult it is to value 
a firm; investors in private placements will require larger discounts. Given this information 
content we would expect a negative relationship between ARs and the discount. Alternative 
way of interpreting the negative coefficient is the higher the discount offered on the placement 
the lower the CARs (i.e. move towards negative returns). 
FRACTION is the fraction of shares placed as a percentage of the total outstanding shares on 
issue before the placement. The information hypothesis suggests the larger the fraction placed 
the greater the information signal, therefore we expect a negative relationship between fraction 
placed and the CARs. 
GFC is binary variable with the value of 1 if the placement was announced after the onset of 
the GFC (we use December 2007 as the cut-off date). Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) showed 
A-REITs raised, on average, $269 million post-GFC compared to $112 million pre-GFC. 
Furthermore, the average discount was greater in post-GFC placements, 12.1 per cent 
compared to 2.6 per cent. A negative relationship with the dependant variable is expected here. 
NET GEARING is calculated as short-term debt plus long-term debt less cash, divided by 
shareholders equity. Jensen (1986) argues that firms with higher gearing levels make better 
investment decisions due to lower levels of free-cash flow. However, Campbell et al. (2001) 
suggests that the institutional structure of REITs and the restrictions placed on REITs free-cash 
flow may mitigate Jensen's (1986) claim. 
SIZE is the natural log of the A-REITs market capitalisation on the day prior the announcement. 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) argue that information asymmetries are likely to be greater for 
smaller firms, therefore a negative relationship is hypothesised for size and excess returns. 
BVMV is the ratio of the A-REITs book value equity to market value equity at the last released 
financial report (both annual and semi-annual reports were used to find the book value equity). 
Low BVMV ratios reflect higher expected future returns due to perceived growth opportunities. 
Given this we hypothesise that A-REITs with a low BVMV ratio to have lower information 
problems. We expect placement announcement excess returns to be negatively related to the 
BVMV ratio. 
REASON is a dummy variable of 1 if the A-REIT identifies that the placement funds will be 
used for an acquisition of property or development of a property. The reason for the placement 
contains a large amount of information for the market, if the A-REIT is using the funds to 
support their core business (generation of rental income) we would expect the information 
signal to be positive and hence a positive impact on excess returns. 
Data 
Private placement announcements from January 2000 to December 2012 were collected from 
the Datanalysis database, using the search function for ASX announcements. For the placement 
to be included in the dataset the following screens were conducted: 
the firm must be classified as an A-REIT; 
there must be an absence of large-scale confounding events occurring within ten days of the 
announcement; 
the firms share price data must be listed on Datanalysis for the period beginning 120 trading 
days prior the announcement and ending ten days post; and 
the A-REIT cannot have a concurrent equity issue, for example, a rights issue, on offer within 
the analysis and comparison period. 
A total of 96 private placement announcements were identified that met the above criteria. 
Table II provides the descriptive statistics for the 96 placements. We see that the average 
placement size was $146.24 million, slightly lower than the average reported by Dimovski and 
O’Neill (2012) that covered a period of 2006-2011. The largest placement was conducted by 
Westfield in 2009 for a value of $2.9 billion. While the total proceeds for the 96 private 
placements being over $14 billion. The average discount offered for private placements was 
2.37 per cent, again lower than the 7.1 per cent presented by Dimovski and O’Neill (2012). 
The average size of the A-REIT involved in our sample is almost $2 billion, however, the 
median is over $900 million, suggesting that larger A-REITs utilise private placements more 
often than smaller A-REITs. The average fraction of shares placed is 10.37 per cent, below the 
15 per cent level that requires shareholder approval under ASX listing rules. 
 
Table III displays the top 10 private placements, by proceeds raised, for pre- and post-
December 2007 announcements. Westfield has been involved in the three largest private 
placements within the 96 observations. Comparison of the means between both panels shows 
no distinct differences. Only the average discounts in post-December 2007 placements are 
greater than the pre-December period. It is interesting to note the reasons for the placements. 
Six of the placements in panel B were used to reduce debt levels. While the vast majority of 
private placements in panel A were to fund core business activities. This outcome highlights 
the liquidity problems faced by A-REITs as a result of the GFC and supports the claims by 
Zarebski and Dimovski (2012). 
 
As discussed above, observations that involved a concurrent private placement and rights issue 
announcement are removed from the data set. The aim of this study is to examine the impacts 
on shareholder wealth around private placements only, thus inclusion of these observations 
would create noise in the data set. However, we feel that it should be noted that post-December 
2007 there were 27 private placements made by A-REITs that were made concurrently with a 
rights issue, raising over $12 billion. The average discount offered in the raising was 12.38 per 
cent[6]. The impact on shareholders wealth is outside the scope of this study, but it is certainly 
an area that warrants further research. 
 Results 
Event study results 
Table IV displays the daily excess returns for the full data sample of private placements from 
January 2000 to December 2012, along with the cumulative average ARs. We find significant 
ARs on days ten and four prior the announcement, suggesting minimal, if any, information 
leakage about the placement to the market. The CARs reaches a high of +1.85 per cent on day 
−4. Days 0 and +1 following the announcement display significant negative ARs of −0.25 and 
−1.07 per cent, respectively. This result provides support for the information signalling 
hypothesis, in that the new information conveyed that managers believe the firm is overvalued 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 Figure 2 displays the CARs for the A-REIT private placement sample over the 21-day 
event period. We can see that in the days leading up to the announcement there is an upward 
trend in the CARs, this result provides support to the claims by Marciukaityte et al. (2007) that 
REIT managers are able to time their placements with the market. On the days after the 
announcement the CARs drop significantly and the trend continues for the remainder of the 
study period. This outcome is in contrast to the findings of Wruck (1989) who finds no evidence 
of post announcement share price drift. 
 To further investigate the impact of private placements on A-REIT shareholders we 
examined the CARs over a number of different event windows, these results are displayed in 
Table V. Panel A displays the results for the full study period of January 2000-December 2012. 
We find, consistent with Marciukaityte et al. (2007), but in contrast to prior general corporate 
finance studies[7], that A-REITs experience negative and significant ARs around the three-day 
event window [−1,+1] of −1.29 per cent. Examination of pre and post announcement event 
windows shows that in the period leading up to the announcement, [−10,0] and [−5,0], A-
REITs earn positive but insignificant CARs. However, the [−1,0] event window shows A-
REITs earn negative and significant CARs of −0.222 per cent. This outcome suggests there 
may have been some information leakage, or market expectation about the placement 
announcement. Post announcement CARs are negative and significant, −1.623 per cent over 
the [0, +5] event window and −1.694 per cent for the [0,+10] window. These results provide 
further support for our daily excess returns results. 
  To investigate the impact of the GFC, we divided the sample into pre- and post-
December 2007, the CARs over these sub periods are displayed in panels B and C, respectively, 
of Table V. The pre-GFC results show, consistent with the full sample, that existing 
shareholders experience negative and significant excess returns on the day of announcement 
along with the [0, +5] and [0,+10] event periods. Panel C displays the results for the post-GFC 
sub-sample, we again find post announcement excess returns in the [0, +10] window to be 
significant and negative (−5.397 per cent). This result is higher than those presented in the full 
sample and pre-GFC sample. Furthermore, we note that the CARs across all event windows 
are larger than those presented in panels A and B[8]. This highlights the higher market volatility 
that was experienced as a result of the GFC, Dimovski and O’Neill (2012) also provided 
evidence of greater market volatility between their pre and post-GFC data sample. Consistent 
across all periods we find positive, but insignificant, excess returns in the period's prior 
announcement, further supporting the notion that A-REIT managers are attempting to time 
their announcements with the market. 
 
 Our results are comparable to those presented for REIT SEOs, both Ghosh et al. (1999) 
and Ong et al. (2011) find that REITs experience negative and significant excess returns around 
a SEO announcement. We find strong support for the information hypothesis and suggest that 
A-REITs face greater information asymmetries than what has been previously suggested 
(Hartzell et al., 2006; Sah and Seagraves, 2012). Feng et al. (2007) discusses in a regulated 
industry management has less discretion and therefore information asymmetry is less severe. 
Feng et al. (2007) note that some authors argue that illiquidity and heterogeneity of property 
assets make valuation difficult, while others posit that the value of a REIT is the aggregate 
value of its assets. This study is the first, to our knowledge, to explicitly examine A-REIT 
shareholders risk adjusted returns from private placements over a period that includes the GFC. 
Results show that existing investors experience significant wealth reductions around private 
placement announcements. 
 Our findings are supported by Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2007) who provide evidence of 
a structural shift in the risk characteristics of A-REITs due to factors such as a greater reliance 
on non-passive income, higher debt levels and a greater exposure to international property. 
Furthermore, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) note a dramatic shift in REIT management and thus a 
greater investment in managerial skills resulting in REITs being more vulnerable to 
information asymmetry problems. 
Cross-section regression results 
In regression analysis a number of the independent variables may exhibit high levels of 
correlation, this can have an impact on their explanatory power and hence the robustness of the 
results. Table VI displays the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables. It can be seen 
that we experience a moderate level of correlation (−0.404) between the variables GFC and 
REASON, however, this level is not high enough to warrant adjustment of the model. The 
remaining variables all exhibit a low level of correlation. 
 Table VII displays the regression model results. OLS is employed to test the 
significance of the relationship between A-REIT three-day CARs [−1,+1] and the independent 
variables described above. Standard diagnostic tests are also run to examine for normality, 
hetroskedasticity[9] and omitted variables. Panel A shows the regression results for the full 
sample; Panel B provides the results after removal of the GFC variable, which appears to have 
no impact on the observed ARs. 
 The results show a negative relationship between excess returns and discount across 
both models, suggesting that the higher the discount offered on a placement the greater the 
information signalling impact. This result supports Hertzel and Smith (1993) hypothesis that 
the more difficult it is to value a firm the larger the discount investors will require. We also 
find a positive relationship with reason for the placement, suggesting that when A-REITs 
announce the placement funds will be used to fund their core business the information signal 
is positive. This outcome has not previously been identified in prior REIT research. However, 
the significance of the variable disappears in panel B. 
 Consistent with Hertzel and Smith (1993), we find a strong negative relationship across 
both panels for BVMV ratio. This result suggests that A-REITs that are trading a premium to 
net tangible assets earn higher excess returns, supporting our hypothesis that A-REITs with 
low BVMV ratios have lower information problems. We note from the descriptive statistics 
table that the maximum value of the BVMV variable was 5.877, over five-times greater than 
the mean. To investigate if this observation was driving the significance, the model was run 
after winsorising the BVMV value[10]. Results showed that the coefficients and p-values 
remained stable, however, the significance of BVMV fell to the 5 per cent level. Finally, we 
find that net gearing is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in panel A and at the 10 
per cent level in panel B. That is, higher geared A-REITs earn lower excess returns in a 
placement announcement. This result is in contrast to Marciukaityte et al. (2007), who found 
no statistically significant relationship between leverage and ARs. Campbell et al. (2001) posit 
that highly geared REITs (with low historical growth rates) may find it challenging to decrease 
their gearing levels due to the pay out requirements of REITs. 
 To investigate the net gearing result further, we isolated any observation from our data 
set that noted the reason for the placement was to repay debt or restructuring of their balance 
sheet[11]. We found that the average excess return for these A-REITs was −3.246 per cent over 
the [−1,+1] period, they also had higher than average BVMV ratios (1.35 vs. sample average 
of 0.948) and higher gearing (104.11 per cent vs sample average of 57.94 per cent). These 
results suggest that the announcement of the placement has conveyed information to the market 
of possible financial distress. To investigate if the gearing result was being driven by the impact 
of the GFC and the recapitalisation that occurred in this period, we re-ran the regression model 
with only the observations up to December 2007. These results are presented in Table VIII, it 
can be seen that the gearing variable remains negative and significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Therefore, providing robustness to our conclusion that the private placement announcement for 
repayment of debt levels/balance sheet restructuring may convey possible financial distress. 
 
Conclusion 
Using event study methodology we examine the wealth effect of A-REIT shareholders around 
the announcement of a private placement. Overall our results reject the undervaluation 
hypothesis suggested by Hertzel and Smith (1993), we find support the information signalling 
theory as presented by Myers and Majluf (1984). We find, in contrast to prior studies of 
conventional firm placements (e.g. Wruck and Wu, 2009), on average, private placements have 
a negative and significant impact on existing shareholder wealth. However, to obtain a more 
in-depth understanding of the implications for A-REIT investor’s further research is warranted. 
Analysis of the long-term post-placement impact on shareholder wealth may shed more light 
on the motivations for private placements by A-REITs. It may-be hypothesised that because 
private placements are quicker and less expensive for A-REITs, relative to other equity raising 
options, that the long-term benefits to investors may outweigh the short-term costs. We also 
find evidence to support Marciukaityte et al. (2007) that A-REIT managers attempt to time 
their placements with favourable market conditions. 
 Our regression analysis shows that price reversal from the information content in the 
placement announcement is lower for A-REITs with low BVMV ratios. Placements by A-
REITs trading at a premium to NTA may signal that the firm is in a strong financial position 
and the announcement has a positive impact on shareholders wealth. Results also show that A-
REITs that utilise placement funds for core business activities has a positive impact of ARs for 
investors. In contrast, we find A-REITs with higher gearing levels have a negative effect on 
shareholder excess returns. This outcome may signal to the market possible financial distress 
when making a placement announcement. Finally, results suggest that A-REITs with higher 
information asymmetries offer higher price discounts. 
 As discussed above, we believe that more research in this area is warranted. This 
includes the examination of the long-term impacts on investors post the private placement, 
along with assessment of placements announced concurrently with rights issues. In addition, 
further research into the relationship between private placements by A-REITs, separated by 
management structure (internal vs external) and announcement ARs may also shed more light 
on the underlying hypotheses. 
Notes  
1. Average annual returns for the sector over the one and three-year periods ending December 
2012 were 32.18 and 10.6 per cent, respectively.  
2. Price discount was calculated as the closing price the day before the placement 
announcement less the subscription price, divided by the closing price the day before.  
3. S&P/ ASX200 is the investable benchmark for the Australian equity market. The index is 
comprised of the top 200 listed stocks on the ASX.  
4. See Scholes and Williams (1977) for full discussion on adjusted f3 methodology.  
5. See Brown and Warner (1985) for event study statistical tests.  
6. For sake of space, the full data are not presented here, but are available upon request.  
7. For example, Hertzel and Smith (1993); Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) and Wruck and Wu  
(2009) all found positive and significant excess returns around the announcement period.  
8. We acknowledge that the lower number of observations may have an impact on our findings; 
however, they do show higher volatility in the market place post-GFC.  
9. White Test reported hetroskedasticity, thus model was re-run to adjust for this.  
10. This was the only BVMV value that was outside two standard deviations from the mean.  
11. We extracted 13 observations. Seven of the 13 observations occurred after the start of the 
GFC (December 2007). Full results are not presented here, but available upon request. 
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Figure 2 Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
 
Table I Leading A-REITs by market capitalisation 
 
  









Table III Top 10 placements – pre- and post-December 2007 
 
  
Table IV Daily average abnormal return 
 
 
Table V Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
  
Table VI Correlation coefficient matrix of independent variables 
 
 
Table VII Regression Results for private placements by A-REITs 
 
  
Table VIII Regression Results for private placements by A-REITs – prior GFC 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
